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Investments in a Combined Energy Network Model:
Substitution between Natural Gas and Electricity?
Jan Abrell∗ Hannes Weigt†
June 6, 2014
Natural gas plays an important role in the future development of electricity
markets as it is the least emission intensive fossil generation option while
additionally providing the needed flexibility in plant operation to deal with
intermittent renewable generation. As both the electricity and the natural
gas market rely on networks, congestion on one market may lead to changes
on another. In addition, investments in one market have an impact in the
other and may even become substitutes for one another. The objective of this
paper is to develop a dynamic model representation of coupled natural gas
and electricity network markets to test the potential interaction with respect
to investments. The model is tested under simplified conditions as well as
for a stylized European network setting. The results indicate that there is
a potential for investment-substitution and significant market interactions
that warrants the application of coupled models especially with regard to
simulations of long term system developments.
Keywords: Electricity network, Natural gas network, Europe, MCP
1. Introduction
Throughout the world a transition of existing energy systems is supposed to take place in
the coming decades. Industrialized countries aim for a switch from fossil based to more
renewable energy fueled systems and in developing regions of the world a significant
increase of energy demand will occur. Both developments will require a large amount of
investments in energy production and transport infrastructure (IEA (2011a) estimates
investment needs of ca. 38 trillion $ till 2035). As energy markets are interlinked
∗Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, Center for Energy Policy and Economics at ETH Zurich,
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with each other due to the substituting character for specific utilization (e.g. heating
oil/gas vs. heating with biomass vs. electricity) and the direct usage of energy fuels
in downstream markets (e.g. coal, oil and gas as fuel input for electricity) the relations
between markets need to be accounted in estimates of future developments. In addition
energy markets often rely on network structures which add a spatial layer to the problem.
This interaction of energy markets is particular relevant for natural gas and electricity
systems. The increasing importance of emission reductions raises the need for a shift from
coal based to natural gas fired units. Similar the increased utilization of intermittent
renewable generation units raises the need for more flexible generation units as back-up
capacities which are mainly assumed to be gas fired. These developments will likely
increase demand for natural gas in the electricity sector which can raise the need for
investment in gas infrastructure. On the supply side the development of unconventional
gas and further increases in the LNG infrastructure can lead to shifts in the global natural
gas market prices (IEA, 2011b) which in turn will have an impact on the dispatch order
of existing electricity units and influence investment incentives. As this interaction is
becoming increasingly relevant for gas and electricity markets due to the importance of
gas as future fuel and the network characteristics of both markets research addressing this
interaction has enlarged in recent years. Rubio et al. (2008)provide a review on integrated
natural gas and electricity system planning and highlight economic and market related
aspects.
A considerable research focus is on the incorporation of natural gas constraints in the
short run electricity market dispatch via different modeling approaches. Shahidehpour
et al. (2005) accomplish this by focusing this interaction from the electricity market
perspective by highlighting the impacts of natural gas infrastructure contingencies on
the short run dispatch and price outcomes without a direct model coupling. Several
settings are based on two stage models like Urbina and Li (2008) that use a two stage
modeling approach with a unit commitment and a network analysis to provide a dispatch
and security analyzes with a stylized test system. Similar Li et al. (2008) decompose the
setting in a unit commitment model as mixed integer problem and a network analysis
as sub-problem. Liu et al. (2009) also use the unit commitment as master problem but
provide two sub-problems; the power and natural gas transmission feasibility checks.
Mello and Ohishi (2006) develop a dispatch model of gas and electricity using an iterative
approach coupling a classical dispatch model with a nonlinear natural gas flow model.
Another approach is the hub system applied by Geidl and Andersson (2005), Koeppel
and Andersson (2009) and Krause et al. (2011). It allows incorporating different energy
carriers while accounting for flows within the hub (e.g. gas to electricity conversion)
and between the hubs (i.e. networking restrictions). Other approaches include a hybrid
approach with evolutionary strategy algorithm (e.g. Unsihuay et al., 2007), formulations
of integrated markets using the network simplex method (e.g. Gil et al., 2003; Quelhas
et al., 2006), including the dynamic aspects of natural gas velocity via quasi dynamic
linear modeling (Damavandi et al., 2011), and deriving a single model representation
(e.g An et al., 2003, applying primal-dual interior-point methods).
Contrary to the optimization approaches above, Abrell and Weigt (2012) provide a
single model representation based on a partial equilibrium market model which includes
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the interactions of natural gas and electricity networks. The model is time static and
applied for a European test case to highlight the interacting effects of down and up-
stream impacts. The objective of the paper at hand is to extend this time static setting
to a dynamic investment representation.
So far only limited approaches exists that address coupled investment settings out-
side of more generalized energy system model frameworks (e.g. MARKAL or POLES).
Unsihuay-Vila et al. (2010) develop a coupled MIP optimal investment model for natural
gas and electricity networks but do not account for loop flow characteristics. They apply
the model to both a test case and the Brazilian network showing the importance of gas
storage in an electricity market with uncertain hydro availability. Lienert and Lochner
(2012) combine an electricity model (DIME) and a natural gas model (TIGER). Trans-
mission is represented in a stylized approach based on net-transfer-capacities. They ap-
ply the model to the European markets highlighting the short run impact of volatile gas
prices and providing long term assessments on gas fired generation capacities. Bakken
et al. (2007) develop a coupled model design for multiple energy infrastructures called
eTransport. However, the investments are externally defined and ranked by the model
approach but no endogenous optimal investment is obtained. Geidl and Andersson
(2006) use the hub based approach described above for a structural optimization regard-
ing the conversion technologies in the hubs (i.e. plant technologies) but not the network
connecting the hubs.
Chaudry et al (2014) develop a combined network extension model for natural gas and
electricity with detailed network flow representations. The model is formulated as cost
minimization. Although, a DC-load flow approach is used for the electricity network it is
not indicated whether the feedback effect of investments on the flow pattern is accounted
in the model. The application to the UK system relies on a linear setup of the British
electricity transmission system and therefore does not capture the full nature of meshed
network extension.
The objective of this paper is to develop a representation of coupled natural gas and
electricity markets focusing on investment options while accounting for the network char-
acteristics of both markets. The underlying model is an extension of the static market
representation in Abrell and Weigt (2012) by including time dimensions and investment.
The natural gas market is largely characterized by seasonal patterns whereas the elec-
tricity market is defined by daily load levels which requires a matching of the two time
frames. Investments in natural gas transport infrastructure and power plants follows
classical investment representations. However, investments in electricity transmission
require a closed formulation of the resulting changes in the networks power transfer dis-
tribution factors to capture the impact of meshed networks and loop flows. The dynamic
model will be tested under simplified conditions to highlight the impact of meshed elec-
tricity networks and the basic substitution effect between gas and electricity. Afterwards
a stylized representation of the continental European markets will be analyzed to present
potential impacts on future investment developments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general
assessment of the investment problem in coupled natural gas and electricity markets. In
Section 3 the modeling framework is presented. Following, in Section 4, we first present
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a numerical illustration of the effects. Afterwards, the European test setting is presented
and the scenario results are evaluated. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Interaction of natural gas and electricity markets
There are basically two interaction aspects of natural gas and electricity markets. The
first is the direct competition as potential fuel for end usage in the heat sector. This is
largely driven by the cross price elasticity of both fuels and investment cycles in heating
infrastructure particularly for households. This interaction is often represented in CGE
frameworks and will not be the scope of this paper.
The second interaction is the linkage of gas as potential fuel for electricity generation
and subsequent the bidirectional interdependency on market operation and investment
decisions. In separated models this usually becomes sort of a chicken-or-egg problem as
assumptions about one market lead to a specific pattern in the other market which in
turn can alter the assumed setting in the first place. While this is true for basically all
subsequent markets, the natural gas/electricity setting is furthermore complicated by
the existence of a network structure making a coupling of both markets within a single
model framework more complex and introducing spatial and physical elements.
This interaction and the network dependence can be highlighted when assuming the
behavior of an electricity generator:
max
X≥0,CAP≥0
pi = (p− c)X − cinvCAP (1)
s.tCAP ≥ X (λ) (2)
The generator maximizes its profits (equation 1) by deciding about its generation output
(X) and installed generation capacity (CAP ) given the market price for electricity (p),
its variable generation cost (c) and investment costs (cinv). The installed capacity level
restricts the possible generation output (equation 2) and the associated shadow prices
λ is given in parenthesis. Besides the capacity restriction, the first order conditions
become:
c+ λ ≥ p ⊥ X ≥ 0 (3)
cinv ≥ λ ⊥ CAP ≥ 0 (4)
Assuming an interior solution, i.e. generation to be strictly positive, these conditions
hold with strict equality: Consequently: cinv = p − c. Thus the investment volume
in the electricity sector depends on the spread between market prices and generation
costs. The market price depends on the location of the plant and therefore includes the
network restrictions and the generation costs depend on the plant efficiency η and the
fuel price and therefore includes all market aspects on the relevant fuel market. While
both aspects can be approximated by using external parameters or simplified market
representations this becomes increasingly complicated in large systems and dynamic
settings. Furthermore, similar dependencies can be derived for any market participant
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in the electricity and fuel markets. As electricity markets typically depend on more
than one fuel as input due to the different technical characteristics and running hours,
and the long lifetimes of installed capacities keeps mixed power plant fleets online for
several decades, changes in the underlying fuel prices can easily change the actual market
operation.
Figure 1: Investment trade-offs in an natural gas based electricity network market
Another perspective to look at the problem is considering the different possibilities
and trade-offs when deciding about investments. Within this paper we will focus on
two major trade-offs: First, the substitution between electricity network and generation
investments and second, the substitution between using natural gas or electricity as
transport option.
Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of those different trade-offs. Given a de-
mand function at any location in the electricity market the respective local supply curve
is a combination of the unconstrained supply merit-order and the impact of transmission
constraints (Figure 1, left panel).1 The unconstrained supply represents the available
generation park in the system. Given network topology and line capacities the local
supply curve can deviate from the system wide supply curve due to congestion. As elec-
tricity transmission is basically cost free the difference is solely based on limitations of
which plants are able to supply a given network node.
Investment in generation capacity will lead to a shift of the unconstrained supply curve
towards the right. However, this does not necessarily translate into a price reduction
at all network locations. Congestion can reduce the impact of plant capacity additions
at specific locations. Similar, an investment in transmission capacity will lead to a
shift of the locational transmission constrained supply curve towards the right. Again,
relieving congestion does not necessarily lead to price reductions at all network locations.
1Given the nature of power generation the supply curve in an electricity market is typically a step-
wise, upward sloping function. The presented linear functions are for presentation purpose only.
Nevertheless, the same general logic and conclusions also hold for step-wise functions.
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Which of the two options is the least cost solution therefore depends on the location in
the system and the relevant network and plant restrictions. In addition to this basic
trade-off between production and transport investments electricity networks are subject
to external effects. As power-flows follow physical laws a change in either the supply
conditions of the system (the injection pattern) or the transmission system itself (the
lines resistances) will lead to changes in the flow pattern. This in turn can lead to positive
as well as negative externalities leading to corresponding shifts in the local supply curve.
The trade-off between natural gas and electricity investments is based on electricity
generation. Investments in natural gas transmission will lead to a corresponding shift
of the local supply curve in the natural gas market (Figure 1, right panel). This price
decrease in natural gas as fuel input for power plants leads to a corresponding downward
shift of the electricity supply curve (Figure 1, left panel). Similar, an extension of
plant capacities can lead to a shift of the locational natural gas demand function and
corresponding price impacts.2
Naturally, the gas-electricity trade-off impacts the trade-off between power plant and
transmission investments in electricity markets. Within any given electricity-gas market
system whether plant extension, electricity or natural gas transmission extensions, or
a mixture of those is the optimal solution depends on the specific location within the
network(s) and the overall market conditions. Consequently, this setting calls for a
combined model approach to capture all those interacting effects.
3. Numerical Framework
The dynamic model setting is formulated as Mixed Complementarity Problems (MCP)
and is based on Abrell and Weigt (2012). We provide the optimization setting for each
market participants in the natural gas (section 3.1) and electricity (section 3.2) market
as well as the market clearing conditions equalizing demand and supply (section 3.3).3
We assume perfect competition, i.e. all market participants take prices as given. How-
ever, the equilibrium concept allows an easy adjustment of the underlying competition
assumptions. The MCP model is formulated in the General Algebraic Modeling System
(Brooke et al., 2008) and solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000).
Following, we first describe the sub-model for the natural gas market followed by the
model for the electricity market. Afterwards the models are linked using the market
clearing equation for natural gas.
3.1. Natural Gas Market
In the natural gas market we explicitly model four market participants: producers,
traders, the pipeline operator and final consumers. Natural gas producers extract the
gas and sell it to the trader. Only the trader serves final demand by buying natural
2Other interactions (i.e. investments in electricity transmission can also lead to changes on the natural
gas market demand) are omitted in Figure 1.
3The MCP version of the model is provided in Appendix A and the notation is listed in Annex C.
6
gas and the pipeline transport services necessary to transport it to the final consumers.
Consequently, three markets in the natural gas market are explicitly modeled: the supply
market, the pipeline transport service market, and the final demand market.
The gas network is described by nodes g ∈ G and pipelines given as directed and
ordered pairs (g, g˜) ∈ G × GP with capacity cappipegg˜ [MWh]. Time period in the natural
gas model are denoted by t ∈ T gas. We assume that natural gas demand in period t at
node g, DEMgasgt is a linear function of the demand price PD
gas
gt at that node:
DEMgasgt = a
gas
gt + b
gas
gt PD
gas
gt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T gas (5)
The natural gas producer at node g maximizes its profit by selling the amount of gas
extracted (Xgasgt ) under the given capacity cap
gas
gt . It receives the node dependent natural
gas supply price PSgasgt and produce under constant marginal cost c
gas
gt :
max
∑
t
(
PSgasgt − cgasgt
)
Xgasgt (6)
s.t. capgasgt ≥ Xgasgt (PCgasgt ) (7)
Xgasgt ≥ 0
The shadow price on the capacity constraint PCgasgt is provided in parenthesis.
The pipeline trader buys gas at the node of origin gˆ at the supply price PSgasgˆt and sells
it at the destination node g˜ to final consumers at the final demand price PDgasg˜t . As the
gas needs to be transported from gˆ to node g˜, the operator needs to decide about the flow
on the different pipelines from node g to g˜, F gasgg˜t and the respective transport services
has to be rented at price PT pipegg˜t . Thus, the maximization problem of the pipeline trade
is given as:
max
∑
gˆgt
(
PDgasgt − PSgasgˆt
)
Tgˆgt −
∑
gg˜t
PT pipegg˜t F
gas
gg˜t (8)
s.t.
∑
g˜
F gasg˜gt +
∑
g˜
Tgg˜t =
∑
g˜
F gasgg˜t +
∑
g˜
Tg˜gt (PNgasgt ) ∀g ∈ G (9)
Tgˆgt, F
gas
g˜gt ≥ 0
Equation (9) is the flow conservation constraint for pipeline flows which states that
at each node incoming and outgoing flows have to be balanced. The associated dual
variable is denoted as PNgasgt and can be interpreted as the price of an additional unit
of natural gas at that node.
The pipeline operator organizes flows F pipegg˜t on a particular pipeline from node g to
node g˜ which cause cost cpipegg˜t . Besides operating the pipelines, the operator also needs
to decide about the pipeline capacity CAP pipegg˜t by determining the capacity investment
Ipipegg˜t . Given the annual cost of pipeline capacity ci
pipe
gg˜t , the maximization problem of the
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pipeline operator becomes:
max
∑
gg˜t
[(
PT pipegg˜t − cpipegg˜t
)
F pipegg˜t − cipipegg˜t Ipipegg˜t
]
(10)
Ipipegg˜t + cap
pipe
gg˜ ≥ F pipegg˜t (PCpipegg˜t ) ∀g, g˜ ∈ G, t ∈ T gas (11)
F pipegg˜t , I
pipe
gg˜t ≥ 0
3.2. Electricity Market
In the electricity market model we have three market participants: generators, the trans-
mission system operator and final demand. The transmission system operator is the sole
trader in the market, buying electricity from generators at their respective nodes and
selling to consumers while accounting for network constraints.
Time periods in the electricity model are denoted by t ∈ T ele. Each time period
is subdivided into load segments k ∈ K := {k0, k1, · · · , kK}. Nodes in the electricity
network are given as e ∈ E and lines are denoted by l ∈ L ⊆ E × E .
Final demand is assumed to be linear for all time periods t and load segments k:
DEM eleekt = aeleekt + beleektP eleekt ∀e ∈ E , k ∈ K, t ∈ T ele (12)
Power plant technology i ∈ I is characterized by the heat efficiency ηif where f ∈ F
denotes the set of fuels. The heat efficiency is assumed to be zero if technology i can not
produce with fuel f . Fuel f is also characterized by the carbon content θf , the carbon
price peekt, and the fuel price pffekt. The generator has to decide about the amount of
output Xiekt and investment into installed capacity CAP eleiekt at cost cieleiekt:
max
∑
i,e,k,t
P eleekt − ∑
f if ηif>0
pffekt + θfpeekt
ηif
Xiekt − cieleiektCAP eleiekt
 (13)
s.t. CAP eleiekt ≥ Xiekt ∀i ∈ I, e ∈ E , k ∈ K, t ∈ T ele (PCelei ) (14)
Xiekt, CAP
ele
iekt ≥ 0
In contrast to natural gas flows on pipelines which can be seen as directly controllable,
flows on an electricity transmission grid depend on the injection at the different flows and
the characteristics of the network. In particular, flows on the network are determined
by the thermal capacity of single lines. Thus, investing into transmission line capacity
alters the calculation of the power flows along the network. The physical properties
of the electricity network are described by the arc node incidence matrix ile, the line
reactance xl, and the benchmark line capacity given as caplinelt . The network operator
decides about net-injection into the grid at node e, Y eleekt and the line capacity CAP linelt
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given the electricity price and the investment cost cilinelt . Given the decisions, the voltage
angle difference ∆e and the flow on line l, F elelkt are determined by physical laws:4
max
∑
e,k,t
P eleektY
ele
ekt −
∑
l,t
cilinelt CAP
line
lt (15)
s.t. CAP linelt + caplinelt ≥ |F elelkt | ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ K, t ∈ T (16)
CAP linelt + caplinelt
caplinelt
1
xl
∑
e
ile∆e = F elelkt (λFlkt) ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ K, t ∈ T (17)
Y eleekt =
∑
l
ileF
ele
lkt (λYekt) ∀e ∈ E , k ∈ K, t ∈ T (18)
F elelkt , CAP
line
lt ≥ 0
Y eleekt ,∆e free
Equation (18) implicitly defines the flow on a line based on the net injection at nodes
e while equation (17) determines the linkage between capacity investments and power
flows. Equation (16) restricts the flow on electricity line l by the install transmission
capacity. As transmission lines are modeled as undirected arcs, the equation holds for
either direction and the corresponding multipliers are denoted as PCLine+lkt and PC
Line−
lkt .
3.3. Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for electricity equilibrates net-injection into the electricity
grid to electricity generation net of final demand and storage. Using the perpendicular
sign (⊥) to denote complementarity of market clearing and the respective price, the
electricity market clearing condition becomes:
Xekt = DEM eleekt + Yekt ⊥ P eleekt free ∀e ∈ E , k ∈ K, t ∈ T ele (19)
On the natural gas supply market, gas extractors sell gas to natural gas traders:
Xgasgt ≥
∑
g˜
Tgg˜t ⊥ PSgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T gas (20)
Natural gas trades have to buy pipeline transport services offered by pipeline operators:
F pipept ≥
∑
gˆ
F gasgˆpt ⊥ PT pipept ≥ 0 ∀∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T gas (21)
The two energy markets, natural gas and electricity, are coupled using the market
clearing equation for natural gas final demand. In order to establish this link, we need
4A more detailed explanation of the line flows and its dependency on the amount invested into the grid
is given in Appendix B
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to establish a mapping from electricity to natural gas network nodes. We assume, that
each electricity node can be served by only one natural gas node but a natural gas node
can serve multiple electricity nodes. This mapping is denoted byMNeg ⊂ E × G.
Besides the locational mapping, we also need to establish a temporal matching as the
market may operate at different time scales. We assume, that natural gas prices are
constant within a period of the electricity model, i.e. the gas price does not vary across
load segments. Furthermore, it is assumed that each electricity period belongs to exactly
one natural gas model period. However, one natural gas model period may serve several
electricity periods. We denote this mapping by MT
teletgas
⊂ T ele × T gas. Given these
mappings the natural gas market clearing equation becomes:
∑
gˆ
Tgˆgtgas ≥ DEMgasgtgas +
∑
e∈MNeg
k,tele∈MT
teletgas
i if ηi′gas′>0
Xiektele
ηi′gas′
⊥ PDgasgtgas ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T gas
(22)
On the left hand side of equation (22) the supply at node g is given as the sum of all
source node gˆ delivering to that node. On the right hand side total demand is given
as the sum of final and electricity demand. Electricity demand is derived by using the
mapping between the network nodes, summing out the electricity time periods, and
identifying gas demanding technologies by a positive heat efficiency for natural gas.
4. Scenarios
4.1. Numerical Illustration
Following, we will provide simple numerical test cases to show the basic functionality
of the developed model and highlight the interaction of electricity and natural gas in-
vestments. Starting with a simple linear design the substitution effect can be assessed
without the impact of loop flows. The linear test case consists of four electricity nodes
connected with three lines (Figure 2, left panel). Three nodes have generation capacities
and the last node has a fixed demand. The generation capacities are ranked by costs
with the cheapest plant having the longest distance from demand. The overall line ca-
pacities as well as installed generation capacities are insufficient to cover the full demand
level. The three electricity generation nodes are mirrored by a symmetric natural gas
network without capacity limitations. However, in the initial setting there is no pipeline
connecting the demand node. Given this simple setting it is obvious that the cheap
generation option has the highest need for network investments to satisfy the demand
level. Therefore, depending on the underlying cost levels the cheap generator will be the
primary investment option as long as network extension costs are lower than the cost
disadvantage of the next costly generator and so forth. Similar, the option to invest into
extension of the gas network and construction of a generator directly at the demand
node will be chosen if the costs of pipeline extension and subsequent pipeline transport
costs are lower than extending the last electricity line.
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The right panel of Figure 2 shows this setup for an arbitrary numerical parametriza-
tion. We derive the optimal investment pattern different electricity transmission ex-
tension costs while both the generation and pipeline investment costs are fixed. The
transmission cost range between 0% and 200% of the generator investment costs. De-
pending on the cost ratio different extension patterns are optimal. The expansion is
focused on the cheap unit and a respective extension of the full network (not shown in
Figure 2) for low transmission extension costs, on the expensive unit for medium costs,
and finally the natural gas network is extended and generation capacity is built directly
at the demand node for high electricity transmission extension costs.
Figure 2: Linear Test Case
The linear setup could be interpreted as a representation of a model formulation
that treats electricity as a directed and controllable flow that accounts for transmission
limitations but not for power flow characteristics. One advantage of the proposed model
formulation is its capability to deal with meshed electricity networks and the resulting
loop flow impacts. Therefore, the second test case extends the linear setup by introducing
a meshed electricity network topology (Figure 3, left panel).
In Figure 3 we extend the network with two auxiliary nodes vis-à-vis the mid and dear
generation nodes and additional lines connecting the new nodes with the existing ones.
The transmission capability is adjusted to allow the same initial transmission as in the
linear case. The remainder of the system is kept identical.
Figure 3: Meshed Test Case
We perform the same extension analysis by varying transmission investment costs.
Although, the meshed network has a high similarity to the linear case the resulting
extension pattern slightly differs (Figure 3, right panel). Firstly, there are two additional
extension phases and secondly, the final natural gas extension is slightly lower as more
11
generation from the mid prices generator is utilized compared to the linear setting.
Naturally, those differences are based on the chosen network topology and the underlying
cost parameter and cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, the example shows that due to
the physical characteristics of electricity transmission the resulting extension pattern can
easily deviate from a simplified linear representation even for highly simplistic network
setups.
The numerical test cases provide us with three basic insights. First, the developed
model is in principle capable of simulating combined electricity and natural gas mar-
ket settings and provides results that are in line with expected outcomes. Second, the
substitution effect between gas and electricity remains valid for both simplified linear
settings and meshed networks, although the actual extension strongly depends on the
underlying cost parameters. And third, the nature of meshed networks makes clear pre-
dictions of optimal investments more complicated and requires the need for subsequent
modeling with power flow elements. A simplified linear treatment neglecting loop flow
externalities is likely to lead to wrong estimates.
4.2. Stylized Application to European Networks
We will now turn to analyze the European electricity and natural gas markets with
a stylized numerical model to evaluate the potential impact of the substitution effect
under real world market conditions. The analysis is focused on continental Central Eu-
rope (Figure 4). Each country is linked with its neighboring countries via aggregated
connections representing 220kV and 380kV transmission lines respectively for the elec-
tricity network (ENTSO-E, 2013) and cross-border pipelines in the natural gas network
(ENTSOG, 2013). The respective connection length is derived as geographic distance
between the country nodes. Furthermore, in the natural gas network the main import
options (Russia, Africa, and LNG from the Atlantic and Mediterranean) are connected
with the relevant European country nodes.5
Each node has the aggregated country’s electricity generation plant capacity clustered
into ten types following ENTSO-E (2013) with average plant efficiency values and ca-
pacity values. Demand is derived from the hourly load values as published by ENTSO-E
and adjusted to match aggregated yearly demand with the values provided in ENTSO-E
(2013). Three load segments are used – peak, mid, and off-peak – which are derived
by ordering hourly load according to the total European demand level and taking the
average values for each third, respectively. Natural gas demand is taken from OECD
(2013) with natural gas production for European countries taken from Eurostat. The
non-European gas producers are assumed to have unlimited production capacities. Their
export potential is limited by the pipeline capacities towards Europe. Fuel prices are
based on 2012 values taken from BAFA for German import prices and adjusted to 90%
for East European countries and 110% for South European countries. The production
costs of the non-European gas producers are calibrated to derive a similar natural gas
price level in the model as provided by BAFA (ca. 30 e/MWh).
5LNG import capacities are treated like pipeline capacity restrictions on the respective connection.
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Figure 4: Stylized European Network Representation
Although, simplified in nature the model provides reasonable market results for a 2012
benchmark simulation. The natural gas market shows lower prices in East Europe and
higher prices in South Europe. The LNG supply option plays a crucial role in supplying
the Iberian markets while Central Europe is supplied by endogenous production and
Norwegian and Russian imports. The electricity market shows higher prices in countries
that depend on gas production like Southern Europe and the Benelux. Prices during
off-peak are on average about 70% of the medium price level while peak prices represent
about 110%. The lower markup between the mid and peak segment is driven by the
dominance of gas plants as marginal units in both load segments in many European
countries. Congestion occurs mainly on lines towards Italy as well as partially on lines
13
from France towards Belgium and Spain.
In order to test whether the European markets are subject to potential investment
substitution effects we derive a scenario setting that provides incentives to extend both
natural gas generation and transmission lines. Given the current objectives of European
energy policy it is expected that firstly, coal fired generation will be penalized due to
its higher CO2 emissions and secondly, renewable generation will further increase its
production share. To capture those two elements we introduce a price markup for coal
based generation effectively pushing it out of the market and we double the renewable
generation share. This will in turn lead to more investments into gas fired generation
and subsequent investments in transmission lines and/or natural gas infrastructure.
Transmission investment costs are based on L’Abbate and Migliavacca (2011) with an
assumed average of 500ke per km for a 380kV line. Natural gas pipeline costs are based
on INGAA (2009) with an assumed average of 1Mioe per km for a 32 inch pipeline.
Finally, gas fired combined cycle investment costs are based in EIA (2013) with an
assumed average of 650 e per MW. For all investment costs the annuity is derived using a
lifetime of 20 years and an interest rate of 4% for the network investments and 7% for the
plant investment. As the substitution between those investments is largely determined
by the underlying investment costs we vary the electricity transmission investment cost
by 50% upward and downward. Power plant and pipeline investment costs as well as all
other parameters are kept constant.
Table 1 provides an overview about the carried out investments in the three cost
scenarios. While it is not surprising to see significant higher transmission investment
if the extensions costs are lower the pattern over all three investment options shows
a clear indication for the substitution between gas and electricity infrastructure. The
most obvious example is the Italian situation. In case of cheap transmission extension
costs Italian electricity demand will be satisfied by imports from North and East Europe
with Switzerland and Austria extending their cross-border capacities respectively. In
case of high transmission extension cost Italian demand is supplied by extending the
gas pipelines towards Italy and Slovenia and constructing new gas fired plants in those
countries thereby avoiding electricity transmission investments altogether. A reversed
impact can be observed in Poland. Due to the model calibration Poland faces low gas
prices thanks to its large supply of Russian gas. The low price coupled with the high
dependence of coal in the original setting makes its both profitable and necessary to invest
into new gas plants in Poland. The generated electricity is then distributed towards the
demand in West and South Europe. However, with increasing transmission costs this
incentive is greatly reduced and consequently investments in gas plants in Poland decline
while the plants are constructed in the original electricity import countries (i.e. Germany,
Czech Republic).
Although the results of the stylized model are to be taken with care in respect to
actual developments in Europe they highlight the strong interdependence of natural
gas and electricity markets. The seemingly high difference in investment costs of 50%
to 150% may not be too unrealistic given the large share of delayed investments in
energy infrastructure (i.e. due to NIMBY or regulatory induced longer planning phases).
Coupled with further changes on the overall market conditions (i.e. the impact of US
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Table 1: Investment Scenario Results
Costs Scenario 50% 100% 150%
Electricity Transmission Investment [GW]
Spain - France 10.81 0.97 -
Germany - Poland 1.3 - -
Poland - Czech Republic 5.01 3.51 -
Austria - Hungary 5.14 - -
Austria - Italy 10.54 3.47 0.03
Switzerland - Italy 1.89 3.36 -
Natural Gas Pipeline Investment [GW]
Austria - Italy 6.66 12.85 19.95
Hungary - Slovenia 2.14 2.14 4.88
Gas Power Plant Investment [GW]
Austria - 5.14 -
Czech Republic - - 1.79
Denmark 1.09 1.95 1.95
Germany - - 1.46
Hungary 2.78 0.32 -
Italy - - 2.08
Netherlands 4.89 9.06 9.36
Poland 24.54 21.38 19.65
Slovakia 1.07 3.41 3.49
Slovenia - - 2.15
shale gas on natural gas prices in Europe) the production and investment cost ratios can
easily fluctuate and thereby change the optimal investment pattern in both markets.
Given the expectation that natural gas will play a major role in transferring electricity
markets towards a high share of fluctuating renewables decision where and when to
build and extend gas capacities should not be considered in a singular electricity market
perspective.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the interaction between natural gas and electricity investments
while accounting for the network characteristics of both markets. The model is for-
mulated as a partial equilibrium representation using the MCP format. Albeit, the
presented model is limited to production and transport aspects the formulation allows
an easy extension to capture further market actors like LNG traders or the dynamic
nature of storage operation. The chosen model framework also enables an easy adoption
of different market designs, i.e. oligopolistic competition on the production and gener-
ation markets and regulated decisions on the network stage. Applying the model to a
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four node test case and a stylized representation of the continental European natural gas
and electricity markets, we can present two important insights for future market evalu-
ations. First, the meshed nature of electricity transmission and power flows leads to a
high complexity that needs to be captured in investment models to provide reasonable
evaluations. This issue is techno-economic in nature and requires the inclusion of basic
electrical-engineering elements in market models. A simplified representation of power
flows via pure (directed) trade flows is likely to provide biased results. Second, natural
gas and electricity markets face a mutual interdependence in investment decision that
requires a combined approach to be adequately captured within model estimates. As
optimal investment decision of substituting alternatives (i.e. pipeline and power plant
investments vs. transmission line and plant investments) depend on the locational price
spreads in the markets which in turn strongly depend on the chosen investments an
integrated assessment is needed. Capturing this interaction in separated models is likely
to provide biased results. The investment substitution aspect is furthermore amplified
by the problems of meshed electricity networks. The paper provides further insights for
the ongoing discussion about the future development about market design in gas and
electricity markets. Most of this discussion is focused on single aspects – i.e. the capacity
market debate in electricity generation or the question about optimal network regula-
tion to foster optimal investments – although they are finally interlinked and therefore
warrant a comprehensive and encompassing approach. The developed model can help
to provide such a bridge between the ongoing fields and help to develop robust market
and policy recommendations for the challenges at hand.
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Appendix
A. Mixed Complementarity Formulations
A.1. Natural Gas Market Model
For the natural gas model the MCP version is derived by deriving the necessary (and
sufficient as the problems are linear) first order conditions of the optimization problems
of the natural gas producer (equations 6 and 7), the pipeline trader (equations 8 and 9),
and the pipeline operator (equations 10 and 11). The natural gas sub-model is closed by
adding a market clearing condition for natural gas at supply (A.10) and demand nodes
(A.9) as well as for pipeline transport services (A.11):
cgasgt + PC
gas
gt ≥ PSgasgt ⊥ Xgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g, t (A.1)
capgasgt ≥ Xgasgt ⊥ PCgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g, t (A.2)
PSgasgt + PN
gas
g˜t ≥ PDgasg˜t + PNgasgt ⊥ T gasgg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜, t (A.3)
PT pipegg˜t + PN
gas
gt ≥ PNgasg˜t ⊥ F gasgg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜, t (A.4)∑
g˜
F gasg˜gt +
∑
g˜
Tgg˜t =
∑
g˜
F gasgg˜t +
∑
g˜
Tg˜gt ⊥ PNgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g, t (A.5)
cpipegg˜t + PC
pipe
gg˜t ≥ PT pipegg˜t ⊥ F pipegg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜, t (A.6)
cipipegg˜t ≥ PCpipegg˜t ⊥ Ipipegg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜, t (A.7)
Ipipegg˜t + cap
pipe
gg˜ ≥ F pipegg˜t ⊥ PCpipegg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜, t (A.8)∑
g˜
T gasg˜gt ≥ agasgt + bgasgt PDgasgt ⊥ PDgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g, t (A.9)
Xgasgt ≥
∑
g˜
T gasgg˜t ⊥ PSgasgt ≥ 0 ∀g, t (A.10)
F pipegg˜t ≥ F gasgg˜t ⊥ PT pipegg˜t ≥ 0 ∀g, g˜t (A.11)
A.2. Electricity Market Model
For the electricity market model the MCP version is derived using the first order con-
ditions of the generators’ maximization problem (equations 13 and 14) and the grid
operator’s maximization problem (equations 15 to 18). The electricity market model is
19
closed by adding the market clearing condition for electricity (19):
∑
f if ηif>0
pffekt + θfpeekt
ηif
+ PCeleiekt ≥ P eleekt ⊥ Xiekt ≥ 0 (A.12)
cieleiekt ≥ PCeleiekt ⊥ CAP eleiekt ≥ 0 (A.13)
CAP eleiekt ≥ Xiekt ⊥ PCeleiekt ≥ 0 (A.14)
P eleekt + λYekt = 0 ⊥ Y eleekt free (A.15)∑
k
(
PCLine+lt + PC
Line−
lt
)
+
∑
k
(
λFlkt
∑
e ile∆e
xlcap
line
lt
)
≤ cilinelt ⊥ CAP linelt ≥ 0 (A.16)
PCLine+lkt − PCLine−lkt ≥
∑
e
ileλ
Y
ekt − λFekt ⊥ Flkt ≥ 0 (A.17)
∑
l
λFlkt
CAP linelt + caplinelt
caplinelt
1
xl
∑
e
ile = 0 ⊥ ∆l free (A.18)
CAP linelt + caplinelt ≥ F elelkt ⊥ PCLine+lkt ≥ 0 (A.19)
F elelkt ≥ CAP linelt + caplinelt ⊥ PCLine−lkt ≥ 0 (A.20)
CAP linelt + caplinelt
caplinelt
1
xl
∑
e
ile∆e = F elelkt ⊥ λFlkt free (A.21)
Y eleekt =
∑
l
ileF
ele
lkt ⊥ λYekt free (A.22)
Xekt = DEM eleekt + Yekt ⊥ P eleekt free (A.23)
B. Explanation of the electricity line flow equations
Following the DC-Load Flow approach power flow F on a line l can be derived using
the voltage angel difference ∆ between the connected nodes. Assuming that the line’s
resistance is significant smaller than the line’s reactance xl the flow can be expressed as
follows:
Fl =
1
xl
∆l (B.1)
The extension of a given line can be considered as adding a second parallel circuit on
the connection with a specific reactance value tied to the chosen capacity extension.
Following the law of parallel circuits the total reactance of a line with several parallel
circuits n can be expressed as follows:
1
xl
=
∑
n
1
xn
(B.2)
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With Xn as the individual reactances of the different circuits composing the line l. If
the line consists of N identical parallel circuits the expression can be simplified to:
1
xl
= N 1
xn
(B.3)
Applied to the logic of line extensions: adding a second identical line to an existing
connection leads to a bisection of the initial reactance. Therefore, given an initial system
with starting line capacities caplinel and respective line reactances xl the impact of a line
extension can be formulated as:
1
xl
= CAP
line
l + caplinel
caplinel
1
xn
(B.4)
This formulation is naturally an approximation as line extensions are typically integer
decisions and capacity and reactance don’t need to be in a fixed relation. It also requires
an initial system and does only allow extension of existing connection but no completely
new connections. Furthermore, the decommissioning of a line is not possible, as this
would require xl to become infinite. Equation (17) in the main text results by substi-
tuting (B.4) back into equation (B.1) and accounting for nodal based representation of
the voltage angle (∆l =
∑
e ile∆e).
C. Nomenclature
Sets
MNeg ⊂ E × G Mapping from electricity to natural gas nodes.
MT
teletgas
⊂ T ele × T gas Mapping from electricity to natural gas model periods.
e ∈ E Nodes in electricity network
g ∈ G Nodes in natural gas network
i ∈ I Power plant technologies
k ∈ K Load segments per time period in electricity model.
l ∈ L Electricity transmission lines
t ∈ T ele Time periods electricity model
t ∈ T gas Time periods in natural gas model
Parameters
ηif Heat efficiency of technology i using fuel f
caplinelt Reference capacity of electricity line l
cappipegg˜ Exogenous initially given pipeline capacity from node g to g˜
θf Carbon content of fuel f
aeleekt Intercept demand function electricity at node e in period t and
load segment k
agasgt Intercept linear demand natural gas at node g in period t
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bekt Slope demand function electricity at node e in period t and load
segment k
bgasgt Slope linear demand function natural gas at node g in period t
cgasgt Cost natural gas extraction at node g in period t
cpipegg˜t Cost for natural gas flow Flow along the pipeline from node g to
g˜ in period t
capgasgt Capacity natural gas extraction at node g in period t
cappipegg˜ Capacity pipeline from node g to node g˜
capliqg Capacity for LNG liquefaction at node g
capregg Capacity for LNG regasification at node g
cieleiekt Cost of investment into installed capacity of type i at node e in
period t and load segment k
cilinelt Cost investment into line l in period t
cipipegg˜t Cost investment into pipeline capacity from node g to g˜ in period
t
ile Arc-node incidence matrix for electricity network. I.e. becomes
one if l starts in node e, minus one if ends there, and zero if no
connection exists
peekt Price carbon at node e in period t load segment k.
pffekt Price of fuel f at node e in period t and load segment k
xl Reactance of electricity line l
Variables
∆e Voltage angle difference at node e compared to the slack node
λFlkt Lagrangian multiplier on voltage angle equation
λYekt Lagrangian multiplier line flow equation
CAP eleiekt Investment into installed capacity of type i at node e in period t
and load segment k
CAP linelt Investment into electricity line l in period t
DEMgasgt Natural gas demand at node g in period t
DEM eleekt Demand electricity at node e in period t and load segment k
F gasgg˜t Flow of natural gas along the pipeline from node g to g˜ in period
t
F pipegg˜t Flow along the pipeline from node g to g˜ in period t
F elelkt Electricity flow on line l in period t and load segment k
Ipipegg˜t Investment into pipeline capacity from node g to g˜ in period t
P eleekt Electricity price at node e in period t and load segment k
PCeleiekt Scarcity price generation capacity for plant i at node e in period
t load segment k
PCgasgt Scarcity price of natural gas extraction capacity Natural at node
g in period t
PCLine+lkt Scarcity rent on electricity line capacity rent positive direction
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PCLine−lkt Scarcity rent on electricity line capacity rent negative direction
PCpipegg˜t Scarcity price pipeline capacity from node g to g˜ in period t
PDgasgt Final demand price gas at node g in period t
PNgasgt Nodal price of natural gas at node n in period t
PSgasgt Natural gas supply price at node g in period t
PT pipegg˜ Transport price for natural gas along the pipeline from node g to
g˜ in period t
Xgasgt Natural gas extraction at node g in period t
Xiekt Output of plant technology i at node e in period t and load
segment k
Y eleekt Net electricity injection into the grid at node e in period t and
load segment k
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